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ABSTRACT 
 Women have been active participants in terrorism throughout modern history; yet 
the existing body of literature dedicated to dissecting and understanding the motivations 
of foreign suicide terrorists largely omits gender as an expression of discourse. This 
thesis uses a case study method to investigate how identity formation and transformation 
increases vulnerability to radicalization in women who become suicide terrorists. Social 
identity theory is applied to two suicide terrorist groups with named female subgroups to 
look for patterns of dynamics in the women’s social relationships and social and 
individual identities that indicate how identity transformation influences radicalization. 
Noted differences in social roles and gender-based in-group expectations between men 
and women were found to be significant for both groups and contribute to uniquely 
complex identity formation in the women. Themes of internal conflict from competing 
influences and shame that threatens in-group connection are common to the women in 
both groups, and appear to be linked to increased vulnerability to suggestion and 
engagement in desperate behavior designed to preserve or restore value. The case study 
analysis shows sufficient cause to indicate further study of radicalization along gender 
lines is worthwhile, as it may improve early identification of women who are most 
vulnerable to radicalization and inform counter-recruiting measures for women, both 
domestically and abroad. 
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“In order to understand the factors that drive women to take up terrorism, it is 
imperative that we understand the role played by women and the subsequent 
transformations witnessed therein.”1 Women have been active participants in terrorism 
throughout modern history; yet, the significant, existing body of literature dedicated to 
dissecting and examining the motivations of foreign suicide terrorists largely omits 
gender as an expression of discourse.2 Women are consistently regarded as actors in 
passive, supporting roles due to the bias in patriarchal extremist groups that have 
religious tenets forbidding their involvement.3 
Nineteenth century studies conducted by French scientist Emile Durkheim, and 
his Israeli contemporary, Ariel Merari, spawned early theories that the actors were 
already suicidal or behaving irrationally prior to any involvement with terrorist 
organizations.4 Around the turn of the century, scholars challenged those findings 
arguing instead that martyrdom is a more accurate, dominant, probable driving force. 
Gender stereotypes lent credibility to a martyrdom theory and assumptions made about 
suicide terrorists included the primary premise that “terrorism is the domain of men.”5 
Men are more often able to choose primary relationships with in-groups with whom they 
 
1 S. V. Raghavan and V. Balasubramaniyan, “Evolving Role of Women in Terror Groups: Progression 
or Regression?” Journal of International Women’s Studies 15, no. 2 (July 2014): 199, 
http://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol15/iss2/13. 
2 Jennifer Hyndman and Malathi De Alwis, “Bodies, Shrines, and Roads: Violence, (Im)mobility and 
Displacement in Sri Lanka,” Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography 11, no. 4 (2004): 
553, https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369042000307960. 
3 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005), 142. 
4 Debra Zedalis, Female Suicide Bombers (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 17, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB408.pdf. 
5 Brigitte L. Nacos, “The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the 
News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 5 (2005): 
435, doi: 10.1080/10576100500180352. 
x 
most closely associate, and in which shared masculinity increases positive social identity, 
which makes martyrdom appealing.6  
Women in terrorist groups cling to familial primary relationships, and rely on 
their male husbands and relatives for status, so it is less likely that women are motivated 
by martyrdom in the same way.7 Examination of the individual actors, as opposed to the 
act, indicates that female suicide terrorists are influenced by specific internal and external 
factors different from those known to be central to the identity of the terrorist group.8 
Moreover, conflict destabilizes both social connections and gender, critical components 
of mutually constitutive identities.9 Thus, it may be that women have become suicide 
terrorists in their own right, as women, with distinct social identities and motivations. 
Social identity theory, specifically the way overlapping and competing identities 
are reconciled in individuals who are members of suicide terrorist groups, provides a 
viable framework for analyzing the behavior of the individuals in groups. At the micro 
level, the individuals reconcile their own identities as members of the group based on 
perceived potential for inclusion or exclusion from the group itself. A woman is not just a 
woman, she comes from somewhere and identifies with particular social, cultural, and 
political groups, any of which are potential points of conflict with each other.10 This 
complicated internal conflict becomes increasingly oppressive and intolerable when 
group dynamics are inconsistent with core or individual values, particularly those born of 
religion or ethnicity, with no clear path forward. At this point, the innate aversion to 
shame renders the individual increasingly vulnerable both to suggestion and to engaging 
 
6 Bonnie Moradi, Brandon L. Velez, and Mike C. Parent, “The Theory of Male Reference Group 
Identity Dependence: Roles of Social Desirability, Masculinity Ideology, and Collective Identity,” Sex 
Roles 68, no. 7–8 (April 2013): 423–424, ProQuest. 
7 Marco Hirnstein, Lisa Coloma Andrews, and Markus Hausmann, “Gender-Stereotyping and 
Cognitive Sex Differences in Mixed- and Same-Sex Groups, Archives of Sexual Behavior 43, no. 8 
(November 2014): 1671–1672, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1007/s10508-014-0311-5; Nyla Ali 
Khan, “Negotiating the Boundaries of Gender, Community and Nationhood: A Case Study of Kashmir,” 
Pakistan Journal of Women’s Studies: Alam-e-Niswan 18, no. 1 (2011): 9, 25, ProQuest. 
8 Karen Jacques and Paul Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different 
Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 306, doi: 10.1080/10576100801925695. 
9 Hyndman and DeAlwis, “Bodies, Shrines, and Roads,” 541. 
10 Hyndman and DeAlwis, 540. 
xi 
in actions that preserve or restore value.11 Framing individual motivation for behavior as 
internal resolution of tensions that derive from overlapping social identities provides a 
new perspective on suicide terrorists. 
To show how identity formation and transformation increase vulnerability to 
radicalization in women who become suicide terrorists, this thesis applies social identity 
theory “through the prism of gender” to two suicide terrorist groups with named female 
subgroups to look for patterns of dynamics in the women’s social relationships and social 
and individual identities. Noted differences in social roles and gender-based, in-group 
expectations between men and women were found to be significant in both groups and 
contributed to uniquely complex identity formation in the women. Themes of internal 
conflict from competing influences and shame that threatened in-group connection were 
common to the women in both groups, and appeared to be linked to increased 
vulnerability to suggestion and to engagement in desperate behavior designed to preserve 
or restore value. The case study analysis showed shows sufficient cause to indicate 
further study of radicalization along gender lines is worthwhile, as it may improve early 
identification of women who are most vulnerable to radicalization and inform counter-
recruiting measures for women, both domestically and abroad.  
 
11 Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 261. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Women have been active participants in terrorism throughout modern history. The 
29 member Russian People’s Will boasted 10 female members who were credited with 
11 terrorist attacks in the early 1900s.1 Eighty-one percent of the suicide attacks by 
Chechen rebels involved the deadly Black Widows, women purported to “have nothing 
left to lose.”2 The Black Tigresses of the Liberation of the Tamil Tigers Elam (LTTE) 
were pioneers in the use of suicide belts, which both introduced suicide bombings as a 
mechanism for committing acts of terror, and specifically engaged the use of women 
because the belts were designed to be hidden under their clothing.3 Leila Khaled emerged 
as a central figure with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in the 
1960s when she was arrested during a PFLP hijacking of four airliners. Made instantly 
famous by the media, Khaled became a recruiting tool and encouraged women to join the 
organization.4 Yet, women have consistently been regarded as actors in passive, 
supporting roles due to the bias in patriarchal extremist groups that have religious tenets 
forbidding their involvement.5  
The existing body of literature dedicated to dissecting and examining the 
motivations of foreign suicide terrorists largely omits gender as an expression of 
 
1 Amy Knight, “Female Terrorists in the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party,” The Russian Review 
38, no. 2 (February 1979): 140, doi: 10.2307/128603, https://www.jstor.org/stable/128603.  
2 Shaul Kimhi, Female Suicide Bombers: Dying for Equality? Yoram Schweitzer, ed., Democracy and 
Security 3, no. 2 (2007): 243, doi: 10.1080/17419160701436116.  
3 Paula Broadwell, “The Growing Role of Women in Terrorism,” Boston Globe, December 12, 2006, 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/12/12/the_growing_role_of_wom
en_in_terrorism/.  
4 Paige Eager, From Freedom Fighters to Terrorists: Women and Political Violence, 2nd ed. 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2008), 1. 
5 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005), 142. 
2 
discourse.6 Early scholars labeled all suicide terrorists as irrational people who were 
inclined to kill themselves anyway.7 Nineteenth century studies conducted by French 
scientist Emile Durkheim and his Israeli contemporary, Ariel Merari, supported these 
theories that the actors were suicidal or were behaving irrationally prior to any 
involvement with terrorist organizations.8 Around the turn of the century, scholars 
challenged those findings and argued that suicide terrorists are not irrational or suicidal at 
all, and proposed martyrdom as a more accurate, dominant driving force. This theory has 
dominated the contemporary literature; however, increases in the use and success of 
female suicide terrorists during the last 20 years seems to indicate more understanding is 
needed, particularly when it comes to women.  
Gender stereotypes lent credibility to the martyrdom theory with assumptions 
made about suicide terrorists included the primary premise that “terrorism is the domain 
of men.”9 Men are more often able to choose primary relationships with in-groups with 
whom they most closely associate, and in which shared masculinity within the in-group 
increases positive social identity, which makes martyrdom appealing.10 Meanwhile, 
women in terrorist groups cling to familial primary relationships, and rely on their male 
husbands and relatives for status, so it is less likely that women would be motivated in 
the same way.11 Examination of the individual actors, as opposed to the act, indicates 
 
6 Jennifer Hyndman and Malathi De Alwis, “Bodies, Shrines, and Roads: Violence, (Im)mobility and 
Displacement in Sri Lanka,” Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography 11, no. 4 (2004): 
553, https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369042000307960. 
7 Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 
2005), 218. 
8 Pape, 17. 
9 Brigitte L. Nacos, “The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the 
News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 5 (2005): 
435, doi: 10.1080/10576100500180352. 
10 Bonnie Moradi, Brandon L. Velez, and Mike C. Parent, “The Theory of Male Reference Group 
Identity Dependence: Roles of Social Desirability, Masculinity Ideology, and Collective Identity,” Sex 
Roles 68, no. 7–8 (April 2013): 423–424, ProQuest. 
11 Marco Hirnstein, Lisa Coloma Andrews, and Markus Hausmann, “Gender-Stereotyping and 
Cognitive Sex Differences in Mixed- and Same-Sex Groups, Archives of Sexual Behavior 43, no. 8 
(November 2014): 1671–1672, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1007/s10508-014-0311-5; Nyla Ali 
Khan, “Negotiating the Boundaries of Gender, Community and Nationhood: A Case Study of Kashmir,” 
Pakistan Journal of Women’s Studies: Alam-e-Niswan 18, no. 1 (2011): 9, 25, ProQuest. 
3 
that female suicide terrorists are influenced by specific internal and external factors 
different from those known to be central to the identity of the terrorist group.12 Conflict 
destabilizes both social connections and gender, critical components of mutually 
constitutive identities.13 Thus, can it be that women have become suicide terrorists in 
their own right, as women, with distinct social identities and motivations? This thesis 
applies social identity theory “through the prism of gender” to two female suicide 
terrorist groups, the LTTE Black Tigresses and the Chechen Black Widows, to look for 
dynamics in the women’s social relationships and social and individual identities that 
indicate how identity transformation uniquely influences radicalization in female suicide 
terrorists.14  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How does identity formation and transformation increase vulnerability to 
radicalization in women who become suicide terrorists?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
In May 1991, Thenmozhi Rajaratnam (more widely known as Dhanu) blew 
herself up as she knelt to kiss the feet of the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi. 
She detonated the bomb just as he was reaching out to raise her up, killing them both. As 
images of her severed head captivated national news the following day, questions arose 
about what drove this woman to commit such a violent act and sacrifice herself in the 
process. When a woman engages in this kind of warfare, it is unsettling and inconsistent 
with the stereotypical constructs of women, their identities, and their behaviors, yet most 
 
12 Karen Jacques and Paul Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers: Different Sexes, Different 
Reasons?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 4 (2008): 306, doi: 10.1080/10576100801925695. 
13 Hyndman and DeAlwis, “Bodies, Shrines, and Roads,” 541. 
14 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 159; Pedahzur 
Ami, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 163; Ellie B. Hearne, “Participants, Enablers, and 
Preventers: The Roles of Women in Terrorism” (research paper presented at the British International 
Studies Association, Leicester, UK, December 2009), 2, 
https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/jaro2010/MVZ203/Gender___Terrorism__BISA__Hearne__Dec_2009.pdf; 
Pape, Dying to Win, 23. 
4 
of the foundational literature on suicide terrorism largely fails to differentiate between 
male and female perpetrators, offer insights on why traditional female behavior is 
changing, or consider individual identity as a factor. Suicide terrorism as a tactic for 
strategic gain precludes separating the motivations of the actor from the motivations for 
the act; however, suicide terrorists are believed to have complex motivations separate 
from the groups that employ them.15 The difference is subtle, but significant.  
2. The Problem with Martyrdom 
It is critical to the discussion of motivation to distinguish that group motivation 
for using suicide terrorists is tactical in nature, and should not be confused with the 
reasons the group is involved either in a larger conflict or with the motives of the 
individual suicide terrorists. Robert Pape explains “political, social, and individual 
conditions that account for why suicide campaigns persist,” exist; however, they cannot 
account for why one member of the group participates in the campaign and another does 
not.16 Quite simply, suicide terrorism is a political strategy, and like all good strategies, 
should further the mission, which relies on buy-in from the group.17 Group strategy alone 
is not usually sufficient to compel members to sacrifice themselves in service to that 
mission and should not be mistaken for individual strategy or motivation.18 The literature 
on suicide terrorists further validates this distinction by generalizing that individuals’ 
motives are rarely identified as having much to do with the politics of the group and 
much more to do with seeking individual rewards, such as redemption, praise, monetary 
compensation for surviving family, and other rewards bestowed in the afterlife.19 
Revenge is noted to be both an individual and group motivation, specifically for the 
Chechen Black Widows given the historical Wahabbist ideology, but even within those 
 
15 Jacques and Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers,” 306.  
16 Pape, Dying to Win, 20. 
17 Pape, 21. 
18 Ami Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 125. 
19 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005), 145; Pedahzur, 154.  
5 
cases, nuances distinguish revenge as a cultural duty from an individual seeking it for a 
specific event.20  
During the 1980s and into the 1990s, volumes of academic literature depicted 
suicide terrorists as irrational individuals, most of whom sought to kill themselves 
anyway.21 Robert Rotberg of the Brookings Institution wrote of LTTE women who blew 
themselves up as sacrificial offerings, it was understandable if not acceptable for women 
who would never become mothers to make such an offering.22 Other scholars, citing the 
famous 19th century study by French sociologist Emile Durkheim that classified suicides 
by type, consistently touted egoistic suicide as the motivation for these suicide 
terrorists.23  
Marked changes in the literature came after September 11, 2001, when the first 
deployment of suicide terrorism in the Unites States demanded further study of the 
individuals who carried out the mission. Ami Pedahzur, professor and subject matter 
expert on extremism and violence, credits the model of martyrdom as being central to 
motivation.24 From this framework, it follows that social acceptance or support of a 
particular behavior defines its value.25 Political scientist Robert Pape’s early divergence 
from the association between suicide terrorism and extreme Islamic fundamentalism 
paved the way for a wider examination of the motives behind suicide terrorists.26 Though 
others like Bruce Hoffman, formerly the RAND Corporation’s Corporate Chair in 
Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency, would continue to argue that religion is still the 
more dominant force, his contemporaries insisted it is not as simple as religion versus 
 
20 Robert W. Kurz and Charles K. Bartles, “Chechen Suicide Bombers,” Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies 20, no. 4 (2007): 533–534, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1080/13518040701703070. 
21 Pape, Dying to Win, 218. 
22 Robert I. Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 25. 
23 Rotberg, 25. 
24 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 163. 
25 Pedahzur, 163.  
26 Pape, Dying to Win, 21. 
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ethno-nationalism.27 Looking across the groups who use suicide terrorism, Pape suggests 
that most extremist groups fight for religious or nationalist reasons.28 This is significant 
because it excludes religious jihad as being the sole reason for these acts, and posits that 
motives may derive from human experiences rather than simply protocols or mandates. 
Pape also writes that suicide terrorism is an altruistic act that seeks not only to show how 
suicide terrorism is consistent with religious doctrine, but also to exclude mental illness 
or defect as contributors.29 Though he does reference the emergence of a collective 
identity among members of these groups and the resulting de-individualization that 
comes from valuing of the group above each individual, Pape’s fundamental argument is 
inaccurate, or at least incomplete, when it comes to the significance of identity in those 
who commit acts of suicide terrorism.30 The resulting discursive framework also misses 
the significance of factors outside of the group that influence personal identity, which can 
include individual religious beliefs, gender-related identities, and personal trauma.31  
Pedahzur, a contemporary of Pape, pointed to the model of martyrdom as being 
central to motivation.32 From this framework, it followed that social acceptance of, or 
support for a particular behavior, defines its value.33 However, martyrdom has long been 
inconsistent with accepted social norms around both suicide and the use of women in 
terrorist agendas. Looking at recent shifts in the acceptability of both, changes in 
perceived acceptance seem to be catalyzed by shifts in religious consent and the 
desperate need for alternative forces for fighting.34 The reason for the shifts is less likely 
 
27 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 131. 
28 Pape, Dying to Win, 23.  
29 Pape, 23. 
30 Pape, 23.  
31 Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 255. 
32 Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 163. 
33 Pedahzur, 163.  
34 Cindy Ness, “In the Name of the Cause: Women’s Work in Secular and Religious Terrorism,” 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 5 (2005): 354, doi: 10.1080/10576100500180337; David Cook, 
“Women Fighting in Jihad?,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28, no. 5 (2005): 381, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500180212. 
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due to changes in religious or ethnic doctrine as speculated, and more likely coincides 
with an evolving in-group narrative. It is unclear whether women are instrumental in 
driving the change, or if now that they believe they have potential beyond supporting 
roles, are trying on roles with more personal responsibility and accountability. 
Regardless, it is clear that the unique motives behind their involvement are not clearly 
understood.35 Mia Bloom further attributes the challenge in identifying and explaining 
why women commit acts of violence to what appears to be the binary, subjugation or 
liberation, and the result of the women’s own choices.36 Indications gleaned from 
research for this thesis find it is either and both. Identity formation is the process whereby 
individuals construct and reconstruct their identities as a means to mitigate threats and 
minimize risk of rejection.37 Independent choice can coexist with external pressure; 
however, the construct of choice shifts to whether or not to follow through rather than 
being free will to be radicalized in the first place, particularly in violent environments of 
sustained armed conflict.38  
In 2017, Adam Lankford, professor at the University of Alabama who has worked 
in conjunction with the U.S. State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, 
writes in “The Myth of Martyrdom” that it is not reasonable to consider suicide terrorists 
martyrs because the accounts of their lives and deaths come from family and terrorist 
leaders invested in the perception of the acts.39 Simply, it is not possible to assign 
martyrdom as a motive for suicide terrorism when the only information about the 
terrorists is coming from biased sources; organization leadership taking credit for the 
mission, and family and friends searching for meaning in the loss of the loved one.40 
Interestingly, despite his opposite conclusion regarding martyrdom, he still makes the 
case for individual personal motives by rejecting martyrdom and suicide as motives.  
 
35 Jacques and Taylor, “Male and Female Suicide Bombers,” 305.  
36 Mia Bloom, “Bombshells: Women and Terror,” Gender Issues 28 (2011): 1–21, doi: 
10.1007/s12147-011-9098-z.7; Hyndman and DeAlwis, “Bodies, Shrines, and Roads,” 542. 
37 Bloom, Dying to Kill, 160. 
38 Hyndman and DeAlwis, “Bodies, Shrines, and Roads,” 550; Bloom, Dying to Kill, 160. 
39 Adam Lankford, The Myth of Martyrdom (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 24. 
40 Lankford, 24.  
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3. Social Identity Theory  
Much of the research on suicide terrorists has sought to identify a transitional 
moment, a time, or event, even an identifiable influence that delineates a clear shift to a 
willingness to die, but no one has successfully identified such a moment.41 Perhaps, no 
singular event is the cause or perhaps the shift results from a shift in social identity and 
perceived self-worth. One of Merari’s studies, which attempted to identify personality 
characteristics in suicide terrorists, identified something called “ego strength” as a 
possible characteristic for inclusion.42 “Ego strength is a concept that captures the 
person’s ability to efficiently cope with external and internal stress, and to regulate one’s 
emotions and needs states.”43 The results of the study indicate that suicide terrorists lack 
emotional and psychological resources to cope with critical decision making and struggle 
with some of the tasks of daily life, though not attributed to diminished intelligence.44 
The study also showed that the suicide terrorists had characteristics consistent with 
anxiety and dependent/avoidant disorders, which are indicative of diminished self-worth 
and increased desire for connection.45 Because these types of disorders can be hereditary 
or result from trauma, it was not ascertained if they were present before the subjects were 
involved in suicide missions. Both scenarios do confirm a potential personality shift 
particularly since the subjects were all diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.46 
Finally, the study concluded that strong evidence suggests that suicide terrorists are 
particularly susceptible to social influence, specifically that of the group on the 
individual.47 While appearing to contradict the earlier sections in this literature review 
that explained it is widely accepted that suicide terrorists are generally sufficiently 
 
41 Pape, Dying to Win, 171. 
42 Ariel Merari et al., “Personality Characteristics of ‘Self Martyrs’/’Suicide Bombers’ and Organizers 
of Suicide Attacks,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 1 (2009): 92–93, doi: 
10.1080/09546550903409312.  
43 Merari et al., 92–93.  
44 Merari et al., 94. 
45 Merari et al., 94. 
46 Merari et al., 96. 
47 Merari et al., 97. 
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educated and not experiencing any significant diminished mental capacity, these findings 
more likely indicate the possibility of a decrease in resiliency and capabilities that may 
have resulted from a shift away from positive social identity and self-esteem. Few similar 
studies are available with which to compare these results, but they do appear consistent 
with the literature on social identity formation in women.48  
Social identity formation is central to the discussion of terrorism, as it gives 
context to the way, and degree to which, members of the group interact with each other. 
It also provides a framework for evaluating groups as having a terrorist designation. What 
is missing in the discussion of motives for individual suicide terrorists is the concept of 
shame as it relates to social identity transformation.49 As previously discussed, shame is 
conceptualized in the theory that suicide terrorists, and more specifically female suicide 
terrorists, are motivated by martyrdom.50 Unfortunately, the discussion abruptly ends as 
the shame identified as a possible motive for women is hastily and definitively attributed 
to rape or some other violation of social norms. Rarely does the literature leave open the 
possibility that shame contributes to emotional instability or vulnerability on a broader 
scale by eroding positive social identity. Vulnerability to shame in women is directly 
related to unwanted negative social identities, or the threat thereof.51 It is compounded 
when social identities overlap, which causes stress and necessitates some sort of 
reconciliation.52 Brené Brown, a clinical researcher in the concept of shame at the 
University of Houston, confirmed that participants in her research studies “often found 
themselves in situations where feeling trapped was inevitable; the shame web entangled 
them with unattainable expectations or multiple conflicting expectations that could not be 
 
48 Justin Pallickal Jose and C. Shanuga, “Psychosocial Determinants of Dalt Identity: Evidence from 
Dalt Women of Tamilnadu in South India,” Voice of Dalit 7, no. 2 (July 2014): 166, ProQuest. 
49 Mia Bloom, “Women as Victims and Victimizers,” eJournal USA, May 2007, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=474005.  
50 Pape, Dying to Win, 23; Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, 163. 
51 Brené Brown, “Shame Resilience Theory: A Grounded Theory Study on Women and Shame,” 
Families in Society: The Journal of Contemporary Social Services 87, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 46, 
https://doi.org/10.1606/1044-3894.3483. 
52 David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way Forward (Salinas, 
CA: Agile Press, 2014), 54. 
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met,” and when this situation happened, the response was to cut connections.53 Social 
theorists offer important theories on motives for female suicide terrorists based on social 
identity, and recommend focusing future research on the psychological dynamics within 
terrorist in-groups that serve to shift boundaries and reframe and reconstruct the narrative 
regarding acceptable and unacceptable behavior.54  
4. Conclusion 
Historically, primary research to investigate the social interaction of suicide 
terrorists has only gone as far as to scratch the surface of how social identity influences 
the behavior of members of these groups who willingly martyr themselves. However, 
almost no research has been conducted to determine how the social identities and 
relationships of the women in these groups influence their behavior as it relates to 
willingly perpetrating acts of suicide terror.55 The concept of shame, a cornerstone in the 
dynamics at play in patriarchal societies, was discounted almost completely in Pape’s 
argument as being associated with altruistic suicides, and therefore, not a factor at all.56 
Yet, newer literature from Khan, Lahiri, and Welten et al. suggests that many of the 
known female suicide terrorists have been victims of rape or domestic violence, seminal 
events to which great shame and shifts in identities are often attributed.57 The desire for 
individuals to absolve themselves from shame is more consistent with egoistic suicide 
than with altruistic suicide or martyrdom, and is the reason to explore alternative motives 
in women who commit these acts. 
 
53 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, 54.  
54 W. Andy Knight and Tanya Narozhna, “Social Contagion and the Female Face of Terror: New 
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55 Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth, and Jeroen Gunning, eds., Critical Terrorism Studies 
(London: Routledge, 2009), 82, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203880227. 
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27, no. 2 (2015): 273, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2013.806310; Stephanie C. M. Welten, Marcel 
Zeelenberg, and Seger M. Breugelmans, “Vicarious Shame,” Cognition & Emotion 26, no. 5 (2012): 845, 
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D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
1. Case Study 
For this thesis, a case study method is used to explore the effects of the in-group 
and out-group narratives on personal identity transformation in women belonging to 
known, female suicide terrorist groups within the LTTE and the Chechen Black Widows, 
using the context of social identity theory.  
2. Case Selection, Study Limitations, and Scope 
Both cases, the LTTE Black Tigresses and the Chechen Black Widows, are 
named female terrorist groups within larger terrorist organizations or movements. Each 
received significant media attention and has been studied academically, which has 
contributed to substantial and sufficient public information being available for analysis.  
After initial consideration of all groups meeting the inclusion criteria, it made 
sense to limit the scope of this study to two particular groups—the LTTE and the 
Chechen Black Widows—that have been active within the last 50 years, represent both 
ethno nationalist and religious ideologies, and about whom the most biographical 
information is available. Narrowing the scope allowed for more targeted analysis and the 
results are more likely to be representative of current and future bad actors.  
3. Steps of Analysis 
Case study is a common mode of analysis in social research, as it is a structured 
way to assess certain elements of causality without encountering the same feasibility 
issues associated with statistical modeling in the social sciences. This case study is 
conducted in accordance with the steps outlined in the Knoff, adapted by Wollman, 
“Research Method, Part II: Case Study.”58  
 
58 Lauren Wollman, “NS 4081” (presentation, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2017), 2.  
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4. Output 
This thesis uses two case studies, the Women of the LTTE and the Chechen Black 
Widows, to show that identity transformations are motivating factors in women who 
become suicide terrorists. The output includes insights into traumatic identity 
transformation associated with female suicide terrorists, and contributing in-group and 
out-group relationships. The output may also lead to recommendations for future research 
showing the physiological response to shame being linked to violent behavior and the 
effects of identity transformation in similar domestic female bad actors. 
13 
II. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY AS CONTEXT FOR 
ANALYZING FEMALE SUICIDE TERRORIST MOTIVATIONS 
Humans exist not only as unique individuals, but also as members of 
social groups. Reflecting this duality of existence are interpersonal and 
intergroup modes of behavior respectively.59 
Social identity theory posits that the social groups to which a person belongs 
construct and influence her identity.60 Membership within these social groups can be 
ascribed both voluntarily, and as a circumstance into which a person is born. Whether a 
person remains in a group is attributed primarily to a perceived positive contribution to 
her identity.61 This contribution can be attributed both to camaraderie with, and to 
acceptance from other members of the in-group, as well as to individual and group 
identification as being superior to the out-groups. However, when membership in a group 
is not voluntary, as is often the case for women in terrorist groups, it appears that positive 
social identity is more singularly dependent on her relationships with other members of 
the in-groups and how she reconciles membership in multiple in-groups rather than from 
membership itself.62 Since her social status may be more dependent on the men with 
whom she is connected, and likewise, she is not likely to be able to contribute to the 
status of a group or choose to which groups she will belong, it appears that the 
reconciliation of her roles and memberships in groups is the primary contributor to her 
social identity. This concept becomes particularly significant when expected or 
compelled actions by the in-groups interact and conflict with any of the following: 
concurrent membership in other social in-groups, self-preserving behavior, human nature, 
or even behavior dictated by specific roles within the same social in-group.63 As 
 
59 Sik Hung Ng, “Intergroup Behaviour and Ethnicity: A Social Psychological Perspective,” Asian 
Ethnicity 6, no. 1 (February 2005): 20, https://doi.org/10.1080/1463136042000309026.  
60 Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories, 21. 
61 Tajfel, 256. 
62 Jose and Shanuga, “Psychosocial Determinants of Dalt Identity,” 164. 
63 As a side note, discussion is ongoing concerning identity theory versus social identity theory as it 
relates to primary influence in identity formation. For the purpose of this thesis, social identity theory is the 
primary context for the discussion of identity formation and reformation. Observed grey areas or fluidity 
with terminology from both theories should be viewed as foundations for expanded study. 
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previously articulated, meaningful discussion on the formation and reformation of the 
social identities of suicide terrorists, as a result of the confluence of social in-groups to 
which they belonged, has largely been neglected, particularly in the case of women.64 
This gap perpetuated the primary supposition that suicide terrorist identity should be 
attributed solely to influences of the terrorist in-group, rather than allowing for the 
possibility that suicide terrorist identity is the result of continuous reconciling of multiple 
social groups and social relationships that influence a person’s identity, of which the 
terrorist group is but one. Further, the omission has led to a previously unacknowledged 
gap in the understanding of female suicide terrorist behavior in particular, and the 
motivations behind it as influenced by much more complex social identities or a shift 
thereof.65  
In order to understand the factors that drive women to take up terrorism, it 
is imperative that we understand the role played by women and the 
subsequent transformations witnessed therein.66 
If the in- and out-groups to which a person belongs construct her social identity 
and if social identity influences behavior, then it stands to reason that examining the 
social groups to which a person belongs is instrumental in understanding behavior.67 
Once known to be a more elusive and rare subset of the suicide terrorist population, 
current literature indicates growth in the number of women committing these acts, and 
especially, in the number of women being recruited by the terrorist groups who use this 
tactic. Given that this behavior is not consistent with the expected norm for women, this 
shift begs the question of why. Instead of focusing on the terrorist group itself, studying 
the multiple social influences on these women may offer better insight than has 
previously been discerned. When life events and threats to salience or safety drive 
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behavior, the resulting behavior is either consistent with the expected norm for the in-
group, or inconsistent when necessary to negotiate and reconcile membership in multiple 
in-groups.68 Therefore, it is impossible to identify the motive for an action from a simple 
examination of the action itself; whether it is an isolated behavior intended to be a 
positive honor challenge to an in-group, or a negative honor challenge to an out-group, or 
whether it is intended to either preserve positive social identity or shift it.69 More simply, 
given that multiple motivations can result in the same action, it becomes impossible to 
know with certainty which one has influenced any isolated action. To determine 
motivation for a particular behavior, perhaps it is necessary to look at it as resulting from 
the reconciliation of multiple influences on a person’s social identity.  
Social identity theory revolves around three core components: cognition, 
evaluation, and emotion.70 Cognition refers to having knowledge or awareness that 
individuals belong to certain social groups. Evaluation refers to the positive or negative 
connotations associated with a given group and membership therein. Finally, emotion 
refers to the feelings derived from membership, e.g., pride or affection for someone’s 
own group or superiority over other groups or members of other groups, etc. Thus, it 
follows that positive social identity is achieved from membership in a group that makes 
positive contributions to members’ social identities. This concept appears to be the same 
for both men and women, particularly when gender stereotypes are not engaged in groups 
with both genders.71 What are strikingly different are the behaviors associated with 
gender roles in those social groups, and the degree to which those expected behaviors 
conflict with each other.72 Consider the toll it takes on positive social identity when a 
person is expected to behave one way based on her gender, ethnicity, or religion, and 
another as directed by the goals of the group, particularly during periods of conflict when 
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exceptions to culture norms are often made. Previous discussions about the relationship 
between social identity and suicide terrorism have largely failed to consider that 
overlapping in-group expectations, as well as changes to cultural norms, might cause 
influences on individual identity to be in extreme conflict. For men, discrepancies in 
expected behaviors are fewer than for women, where expectations are often vastly 
different and vary widely due to both temporary and permanent situations (e.g., war time 
versus peace time, age, marital status, chastity, etc.).73  
A visual representation for all the influential social in-groups to which a person 
belongs resembles a Venn diagram. Social identity theory explains how within each 
circle, or social relationship, membership drives identity through the relationships 
between the individual and the group, and between the individual and other members of 
the group. When the majority of the social groups have conflicting or shifting 
expectations for behavior, both individual identity formation, and maintaining positive 
social identity become more complicated. The violation of social rules and expectations, 
particularly when the social order can potentially be disrupted, often results in a negative 
social evaluation and resulting negative social identity.74 Further, the emotion of shame 
evolves from the negative social appraisal and resulting interpersonal rejection that is 
internalized as self-judgment as inferior.75 Thus, positive social identity formation 
becomes exponentially more challenging to achieve and maintain the greater the 
deviations and inconsistencies in expectations. In addition, if shame is the result of 
negative social identity, and of failing to meet the expectations of the group, then the 
likelihood of a person experiencing shame is directly proportional to the variation in in-
group expectations for membership. It has been speculated that physiological responses 
to shame are consistent with the human fight or flight response and may result in similar 
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adaptive behaviors during antagonistic social environments, but is a topic for further 
study.76 Ultimately, behavior is driven by the capacity to manage, mitigate, leverage, and 
tolerate shame.  
Being members of multiple social in-groups is not unique to women, the same 
overlapping membership can be observed for men. However, it is less likely that rules or 
expectations for behavior will vary significantly between social groups for men as they 
can, and do for women.77 Further, variance in behavior for men does not demand the 
same need for an explanation, perhaps because the groups tend to all be majority groups 
with similar expectations for male members. It is also assumed that men have inherent 
value, unlike the value of women, which lies in how they can be of service, so it follows 
the logic that if a man has inherent value, then behaviors deriving from him are accepted 
as valuable.78 This is not the case for women, particularly in non-Western cultures.79 For 
these women, when behavior bucks cultural norms or she takes on an inherently male 
role, a need to categorize and stereotype her (as opposed to her behavior) often results so 
her behavior makes sense.80 Observations made primarily by the media, such as she is 
behaving like a man, her family has influenced her, and she gets away with it because of 
her looks, perpetuate the stigma around deviant female behavior being directed by, or 
seeking to imitate male behavior so that it has value.81 Since females have less, or no 
inherent value, and are judged on their ability to provide services, deviant behavior must 
be reframed to give it value rather than the value being inherently unique, dictated by a 
woman’s unique identity, and the result of her individual identity reconciliation and 
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reformation.82 Another example of reframing occurs when deviation from gender norms 
in the workplace is used to counter sexual harassment claims.83 In workplaces where 
women have been conditioned to believe that “good women” dress and act a certain way, 
reframing the behavior of a woman who reports sexual harassment as bad or sexual tend 
to favor the men being reported.84 It is pertinent to note that Tajfel wrote of the potential 
deviant social groups have for protecting members’ self-respect when they have enough 
influence.85 These groups are still minority groups; however, behaving more like a 
majority group garners respect while allowing members to retain norms and traditions of 
the minority groups to which they belong.86  
Social creativity and social competition concepts explain the processes by which 
group dynamics can be changed or shifted to improve group salience, perceived group 
standing, or the self-esteem of individual team members, and to give context to group 
norm expectations when enacted by group leadership.87 These concepts seem to be of 
particular importance when the leadership of a social group desires to compel unified 
group activity as a temporary means to an end, as is the case during intragroup conflicts, 
particularly in the cases of ethnic or religious wars. When expectations for behavior 
change, it compels a resorting or reprioritization of the influences on the social identity of 
these women, which erodes positive self-esteem and makes them vulnerable to feeling 
shame, whether real or perceived. Social creativity allows for reframing something, be it 
a belief or behavior to improve group salience or group pride.88 Consider the use of 
women in war. When religious or ethnic doctrine prohibits women from fighting, a 
temporary reprieve can be granted by group leadership, perhaps through a reinterpretation 
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based on spiritual enlightenment to help the in-group succeed in other pursuits deemed to 
be of the highest priority. This topic is discussed further in the case studies. Nevertheless, 
while social creativity is engaged to improve salience or increase pride in membership, it 
can have the effect of changing expectations placed on individual member behavior, once 
again necessitating identity reconciliation for members. 
Our emotions mediate our reactions and responses to everything in the 
world around us, including whether or not we choose to participate in 
political or social movements.89 
Within the context of social identity theory, the concept of shame is particularly 
significant. As discussed by Scheff in his work, “Shame and the Social Bond,” not only is 
it the most social emotion—deriving from a threat or potential threat to the social bonds 
that make up a person’s social identity—but it is also a powerful motivator, whether 
under its influence, or as something to be avoided.90 Throughout the historical discussion 
of motives for suicide terrorism, and radicalization in general, the debate regarding the 
role emotions play has been ongoing. It is far less contentious to associate emotion with 
motives for women than for men; however, the tendency to treat all emotions as having 
the same impact serves to devalue or dismiss them all entirely, particularly in the 
discussion of shame.91 Certainly, other emotions can and should be considered within the 
larger context of terrorism, and even suicide terrorism. In fact, in his discussion of suicide 
bombing and suicide protests, Lahiri identifies four specific types of emotion that are 
intentionally evoked: pride, sympathy, shame, and fear.92 Of these, shame is most closely 
linked to “moral and normative rules,” and is of particular significance as it relates to 
both male and female suicide terrorism.93 Ultimately, the academic concept of shame 
provides a much stronger foundation for the discussion of emotion in social movements 
because it is legitimately experienced by both genders and evokes less social stigma 
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overall. Although the priority of this discussion is to identify the key motives and 
radicalization process for female suicide terrorists, the concept of shame will be shown to 
be a factor for both genders to enhance the credibility of the observation. It is also likely 
this discussion will reveal a possibility that at least two unique radicalization thresholds 
exist, but the focus will be limited to exploring more fully the one most pertinent to 
women. It is the tolerance for shame when social identities are being challenged that will 
be shown to influence the potential for radicalization greatly, which can be explained for 
women by examining the formation and reformation of the social identity at both a micro 
and macro level since it drives social action.94 Though not inconsistent with other 
theories, previous evaluations of the data have largely focused on individual situations 
and events that evoke shame, rather than the shame being a result of an identity shift or 
struggle due to the expectations of competing social groups and social roles jockeying for 
primary influence.  
Social identity theory has been used to differentiate between terrorist groups and 
other groups who perpetrate violence by offering a framework for discussion and analysis 
of the behavior of the groups. It has not yet been fully integrated into the discussion and 
analysis of the motives for the actions of individual members of terrorist groups; 
however, this thesis shows the potential is great for it to be included. Since it provides a 
means by which to give social relationships standing in the discussion of terrorist groups 
at a macro level, it should follow that social relationships at the individual or micro level 
influence the behavior of individuals in the groups. The next two chapters use social 
identity theory; specifically, the way overlapping and competing identities are reconciled 
in individuals who are members of suicide terrorist groups, as the basis for analyzing two 
terrorist groups known to use female suicide bombers. Looking at individual motivation 
as resulting from individual resolution of tensions deriving from overlapping social 
identities can provide a new perspective on suicide terrorists, and can hopefully pave the 
way for mitigation strategies also rooted in the construct of social identity.  
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III. CASE STUDY #1: THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL 
ELAM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Sri Lanka is a multiethnic, multicultural, and multilingual county… 
Dimensions of language, religion, caste, class, region, and urban-rural 
residence cross cut ethnic categories so that individuals hold multiple 
identities.95  
The LTTE began the ethnic battle for control of Sri Lanka in 1972. However, it 
was not until 1986 that women were used in the fighting due to the ease with which they 
could move and travel across borders and boundaries.96 Permitting women to participate, 
and eventually, to establish an all-female wing of fighters, was not consistent with the 
LTTE’s hierarchical chain of command.97 Though women had been known to hold 
positions of political authority in Sri Lanka prior to this point, they were originally relied 
on to support the efforts of the male fighters. Eventually, however, the Birds of Freedom, 
the all-female wing, would help to establish the LTTE as the “most lethal dissident 
organizations in the world.”98 
This case study first examines social identity formation in members of the LTTE 
as the in-group. A modified version of Hofstede’s six dimensions of national cultures is 
used to establish baseline characteristics of the LTTE as a whole to discuss the way they 
influence the social identities of individual members of the group. The behavior of the 
LTTE members as a group is designed to challenge and overcome all other groups to be 
the controlling group in Sri Lanka. As such, when group identities override personal 
identities, all endeavors of the individual members of the group ultimately are in service 
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to that end.99 This primary examination focuses on similarities among members of both 
genders, as well as some expected differences along gender lines, which are inherent in 
the construct of the in-group identity, to lay the foundation upon which the second part of 
this case study will expand.  
The second part of this study examines the formation of individual social identity 
specifically in the female members of the LTTE at a micro level, and pays specific 
attention to the unique combinations of groups influencing identity. The structure for this 
evaluation is macro- and micro-level discussion of the three components from which 
social identity is derived, that of cognitive, evaluative, and emotional, the use of social 
creativity, and markers in social interaction, specifically shame.100  
B. MACRO LEVEL—GROUP IDENTITY 
Within a homogenous group of people, Geert Hofstede has shown characteristics 
emerge that distinguish the group from other groups.101 To identify important 
characteristics easily and efficiently on which the social identity of the group is based, 
these characteristics can be classified by modifying Hofstede’s model to focus on the 
following:  
∑ The respective significance of the individual group 
∑ The differences in social roles between men and women 
∑ The manner of dealing with inequality 
∑ The degree of tolerance for the unknown102 
Individual differences among members of a group always exist, and the degree to 
which any individual has adopted and exhibits the characteristics of the group will vary. 
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However, to discuss individual deviations, either as members of smaller groups within 
the in-group or as individuals, a common understanding of the characteristics of the 
whole group that contribute to the social identity of the members must be established 
first.  
1. The Respective Significance of the Individual Group 
From the beginning, the LTTE struggled to be perceived as representative of all 
Tamils; however, the degree to which members were integrated was strong.103 Its goal 
was social equality with the Jaffra Tamils, to include economic opportunities within a 
Tamil-majority state.104 The group positioned itself to offer economic mobility and 
protection to its members as a way to increase membership; yet, it still struggled through 
the late 1980s until it had largely eliminated the majority of its rival groups.105 Violence, 
in the form of an organized, professional guerilla force, was the dominant mechanism for 
eliminating competitors, and it allowed the leader of the LTTE, Prabhakharan, to 
maintain control both inside the group and out.106 Those who did not join were labeled as 
traitors, which fostered loyalty in the group and dependence on Prabhakaran for safety 
and security.107 
2. The Differences in Social Roles between Men and Women 
“How a group treats ‘its women’ becomes a measure of its legitimacy.”108 The 
LTTE argued publicly that the inclusion of women demonstrated its commitment to being 
fully representative of all Tamil people; however, males were still the dominant gender 
despite the inclusion of women in government and as fighters.109 Strong cultural norms 
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and rules to which women were bound were still observed without much exception, 
suggesting that integration as warriors was not necessarily a step toward equality, but 
instead served as a timely, tactical move both to expand a diminishing cadre of fighters 
and to exploit media and public bias.110 Women were expected to be subservient to 
LTTE men in the home and in battle, and physical separation of the sexes, policies to 
govern sexual conduct (both among LTTE fighters and between the female fighters and 
other men), and different uniform requirements served as constant reminders of the clear 
and enduring emphasis on maintaining female chastity at all times.111 Female warriors 
may have looked and acted like their male counterparts, but in reality, the subversion of 
feminism resulted in an army of militarized virgins who, when not in uniform, did not 
have any more rights than their non-militarized female counterparts.112 Among women, 
the prevailing sentiment remained that any perceived empowerment was merely a 
reflection of the Tamil movement in general.113 It is even speculated that though his 
public support for female warriors is well documented, Prabhakharan’s patriarchal 
personal views were significantly less progressive.114  
3. The Manner of Dealing with Inequality 
Whether or not a group embraces inequality is an indicator of the potential for 
individual efforts to increase positive social identity. Stratification in governance, by 
wealth or by gender, sets up a dynamic wherein smaller in- and out-groups occur within 
the group as a whole. Positive social identity can be achieved in this environment through 
actions that find favor from group leadership. In homogenous groups, displaying less 
inequality among members, positive social identity is fostered through collective 
governance and shared experiences. The LTTE may have recruited Tamils under the 
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banner of nationhood; however, the burden of representing purity and reframing 
traditional values as “the new nationalist patriarchy” was still born by the women.115 
4. The Degree of Tolerance for the Unknown 
This concept is of particular importance because it relates to the group’s control 
over individuality. Greater tolerance for ambiguity allows for greater variance among 
individuals, in both support for the group’s goals and in individual preferences and 
behaviors.116 The LTTE had little tolerance for ambiguity in its members. This 
intolerance is evidenced by the great lengths to which the leadership went to dictate and 
compel acceptable behavior, as well as to ensure members were critically reliant on the 
group for financial support and safety.117 As Hofstede concluded, in groups that maintain 
strict behavioral codes and demonstrate very little tolerance for deviant behavior, 
members tend to be more emotional and uncomfortable, and behavior has been shown to 
be driven by individual effort to maintain adherence and mitigate the shame that would 
come from violating the codes.118 In cultures where the behavior of members is most 
tightly controlled through norms and values, shame and violence related to preserving 
honor is prevalent.119 Moreover, when women are the protectors of a culture’s virtue, not 
just their own, and valued as sacred bearers of family and disseminators of tradition, their 
identities are actively constructed to preserve traditional virtues under the guise of a 
liberal consciousness.120 
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5. Social Identity Construct 
The LTTE grew from a small group of friends into a significant, violent, and 
deadly terrorist group during its lifespan.121 Leveraging Tamil traditions and culture in 
people desperate to improve economic conditions and control Sri Lanka and its resources, 
the leader of the group was able to grow the LTTE into a group of warriors. With loyalty 
being of utmost importance to the group, “a reflection of [its] conventional Tamil values 
and norms,” members relied on the group for economic security, safety, and unified 
purpose.122 Members were led to believe that they could thrive through LTTE 
domination, even if individual roles and the extent to which individuals could improve 
their own standing were not equal for all.123  
The inclusion of women as warriors was not only unique for the region, but also 
served to differentiate the group from other groups seeking control of the land and 
resources. The group capitalized on expanding roles for women to enhance internal 
loyalty and as a tool for recruitment, and leveraged the use of women for shock value and 
honor challenges to rival groups. The media sensationalized female suicide terrorists as 
both heroes and aberrations of womanhood, at once connoting the group as progressive, 
and at the same time, accusing them of violating the most sacred of values by destroying 
its universal symbol as a warning to any who would oppose the group.124 Stories of the 
victimization of women, as victims of rape and sexual assault, were also used as a 
foundation to embrace female suicide terrorists.125 This other pervasive narrative 
surrounding women who commit these acts depicts them as victims of circumstances that 
have rendered them impure, unsuitable for marriage, or otherwise a disgrace to their 
families and to the group. Emphasizing stories of rape, sexual assault, the death of a 
husband, and the inability to bear children, the LTTE exploited media and public biases 
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to reframe female suicide terrorists as martyrs, recapturing their virtue, or absolving their 
shame through the ultimate act of sacrifice for the group.126  
In this construct, the militarization and deployment of women is an honor 
challenge. At the macro level, the reinvention of the LTTE women, as warriors and, 
ultimately, as suicide terrorists, was designed to change the narrative without 
compromising social order, which was critical to preserving positive in-group identity.127 
The in-group effectively took possession of the narrative of the women and elevated it to 
serve the goals of the group, and thereby gave the impression of homogenous social 
identities among its members, male and female. This narrative is consistent with theories 
that motivations for female suicide terrorists are the same as for the men, but neglects the 
possibility that the motivations are more complex. 
C. MICRO LEVEL—INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 
Tamil women “expressed different and intersecting motivations” for joining the 
LTTE, some common to both men and women like nationalist fear and communal 
perception of suffering and oppression, and some of a more personal nature like personal 
distress or in an attempt to lessen the restrictions placed on women.128 As discussed in 
the literature review, conflicting arguments have been raised for various motivations 
behind women who join terrorist groups and who ultimately commit acts of suicide 
terror, including a feminist agenda and as a restorative gesture after the loss of purity or 
value. However, little is written about how the social identity construct may differ for 
women, or the possibility that radicalization has more to do with shifts in social identity 
(either positive or negative) rather than the specific event or circumstance that caused the 
shift. Existing literature has largely ignored the possibility that the social identity 
construct itself differs significantly for women, even in members of seemingly 
homogenous in-groups. Their unique, progressively complex roles and dichotomous 
empowerment in a warring environment does not make them immune to the hegemonic 
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ways in which the patriarchy controls their lives and the narrative.129 Therefore, it bears 
further examination of how social identity is constructed in women. 
Part one of this chapter examined the influences on social identity formation for 
members of the LTTE as the in-group. This second part focuses specifically on the 
female members of the LTTE, particularly those known to be suicide terrorists, to 
examine the social influences on their identity formation, the way those influences 
interact with each other that is unique to women, and how the shame associated with 
identity formation and transformations contributes to the potential for vulnerability or 
volatility that may lead to such behaviors.  
1. Cognitive Component 
Members of the LTTE understood their roles as members of the in-group, which 
influenced expected behaviors and roles based on cultural norms for both Tamils and the 
LTTE. However, the women also faced the “double oppression” that came with 
membership in multiple, usually inferior or minority groups.130 More simply, “one is 
never just a woman,” she is the intersection of her ethnicity, economic status, and the 
social, cultural, and political groups in which she participates.131 Waltraud Bolz refers to 
this viewpoint as “conflict culture,” where women in Sri Lanka are not only exposed to 
the global conflict, but also live dual lives; experiencing conflict between maintaining 
virtue and serving as a fighter.132 While the same can be said for the men, since social 
equality is not a cultural ideal in patriarchal societies like the LTTE, those in-groups, 
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roles and behaviors specific to men are inherently positive, are given greater status, and 
are not often sources of friction or vulnerability.133  
Women of the LTTE are mothers, daughters, heads of household, politicians, 
nurses, teachers, warriors, rape victims, feminists, Tamils, Hindus, Christians, widows, 
disgraces, social outcasts, wealthy, poor, educated, illiterate, old and young. As all these 
identities can reside concurrently in a single person, a sort of shuffling must constantly 
occur to sort out dominant and less dominant influences. Likewise, the expectations 
associated with each identity (behavior, demeanor, goals, aspirations, etc.) must be 
constantly reordered to provide direction for the individual.  
2. Evaluative Component 
“The militarization of society entails a major transformation of cultural, 
institutional and ideological norms in order to prepare civilians for armed conflict.”134 
Using the process of social creativity, blurring the lines of acceptable behavior by gender 
to suspend or enhance social competition, the leadership of the LTTE expanded the roles 
available to women around 1986.135 The catalyst for change at this particular time is 
likely connected to a shortage of male fighters rather than a significant feminist or equal 
rights movement, though all three are noted contributing factors.136 Resistance occurred 
in the beginning in the deeply patriarchal society, with most arguing that allowing women 
to serve in traditionally male roles, alongside men, would compromise the purity of the 
women and make it too difficult for the men to maintain abstinence, a principle rule for 
fighters.137 This problem is not unique to the LTTE, or even to extremely patriarchal 
societies. A 2011 article about changing gender relations in modern militaries cites recent 
studies that show women are viewed as threats to male group cohesion and can disrupt 
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collective identity when serving in the same military units.138 The internal struggle for 
the women to reconcile their paradoxical identities is not something often discussed when 
examining social identity formation because it does not fit the current social identity 
formation model. Instead, it challenges the concept that construction of a social identity is 
at the macro level, and suggests that construction also takes place at a micro level when 
concurrent group membership in conflicting groups is not avoidable. The LTTE women 
likened their new emancipation and empowerment to the LTTE nationalist movement 
and saw themselves as accomplices in the mission, which was a positive influence on 
their social identity. “However, that this new construct of femininity is forged through 
violence characterizes a dichotomy around women’s roles as combatants.”139 The 
reluctance of the men to accept them, along with the heavy burden of having to preserve 
the purity of the group, elicited the opposite feeling.140  
3. Emotional Component 
The Tamil culture dictated at least six forms of social oppression against women: 
laws, religion, inequalities in civil rights, superstition, socialization of male chauvinism, 
and the dowry system.141 Each of these represented an opportunity for a woman to 
violate in-group expectations, which left her vulnerable to social rejection or threat 
thereof, both of which correlate to feelings of shame.142 Within the minority group of 
women, social competition also influenced social identity on a smaller scale, as the 
women competed against each other for status, mates, jobs, and as members of smaller 
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minority groups vying for standing, mothers, elders, professionals, etc.143 Many, but not 
all the women who would become suicide terrorists were believed to be victims of rape 
and that their suicidal sacrifices were acts of contrition to absolve shame, offerings made 
in exchange for redemption both for the women and their families.144 Even those who 
were not initially leveraged for suicide missions suffered profound social and cultural 
backlash when they returned from battle, including swift and immediate reversal of 
privileges and startling rejection from men who now viewed them as being tainted and 
unsuitable as wives.145 Thus, while some took on the terrorist identity to absolve shame, 
others experienced shame as a result of their participation, which served to perpetuate, 
and in some cases, escalate their involvement to avoid marginalization and 
disenfranchisement.146 
Lacking in the literature on the LTTE, and in the discussion of shame as a motive 
for radicalization, are any other influences that concurrently elicit an internal shame 
response and a woman’s diminished perception of herself and her value; stimuli not as 
overtly external as has already been discussed in this chapter. Since limited information is 
available in the literature, this brief discussion on internal shame response is predicated 
on the understanding that shame is an emotion that results from real or perceived threats 
to social appraisal that is internalized as self-judgment.147 As such, a woman’s valuation 
of herself and her own perceived value to the groups to which she belongs is as important 
as that which others have assigned, particularly when her valuation is at odds with one or 
more of the groups. For example, loyalty is a lauded attribute in the LTTE culture.148 
When the in-group rewards loyalty in its members, that loyalty drives behavior. 
However, when a woman has to prioritize her loyalty to the in-group over her loyalty to 
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herself or to any of the other groups to which she belongs (e.g., family, friends, others in 
her profession), she may not see herself as loyal even though it is inconsistent with the 
feedback she is getting from the in-group that influences her social identity. Perception of 
behavior by the in-group also matters in the context of shame. The LTTE values 
Tigresses more than the LTTE women who work with non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) that also support the Tigers.149 The perception is that committed Tigresses are 
working on behalf of the in-group, while the NGOs are threats to LTTE leadership.150  
Self-categorization in contexts like those documented previously highlights 
individual differences in the experience of shame not previously considered.151 These 
individual differences have been largely unaccounted for in literature on this topic likely 
because this kind of data is the most difficult to acquire. Nevertheless, it does suggest the 
possibility that shame may be compounded in LTTE women. This is not necessarily 
sufficient by itself to show cause; however, it does indicate the need for further research 
and discussion, especially when considered with the data from the second case study on 
the Chechen Black Widows. Further, the analysis section in the final chapter of this thesis 
discusses a correlation between compounded feelings of shame and a physiologic 
response consistent with acts of increased violence.  
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IV. CASE STUDY #2: CHECHEN BLACK WIDOWS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The conflict is not a holy war, waged by Islamic Fundamentalists; but to 
say that religion does not play a role at all is not true either.152 
Chechnya’s history is rife with conflict, and long before the introduction of Islam, 
the people of the Caucasus struggled.153 Clans, made up of descendants of a common 
ancestor and headed by an elder, clashed with each other over blood feuds and 
vendettas.154 Clans held family honor in highest regard, and communal equality was the 
end goal of individual identity.155 During World War II, Stalin directed the deportation 
of Chechens to Kazakhstan to protect against Chechen alignment with Nazi forces. When 
they were permitted to return under Kruschev during the mid-1950s, they came back to 
find the Russians had taken over everything. Chechens likened the acceptance of Russian 
rule to being castrated and pushed back under a unified banner of Islam.156 The war 
against Russian oppression escalated in 1991 when Chechnya declared independence 
from Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union.157 The violent campaign against the 
Russians continued to simmer until it erupted with the first Russo-Chechen War, 1994–
1996; however, the use of suicide terrorism was not documented until 2000, during the 
second Russo-Chechen War.158  
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This case study also examines social identity formation, this time in the northern 
region of Chechnya as Chechens begin to unify under Islam to stave off Russian rule. The 
same modified version of Hofstede’s six dimensions of national cultures is used to 
establish baseline characteristics of the Chechens as the in-group to discuss the way 
group dynamics influence the social identities of individuals. The primary examination 
focuses on similarities among members of both genders, as well as some expected 
differences along gender lines, which are inherent in the construct of the in-group 
identity, to lay the foundation upon which the second part of this case study will expand.  
The second part of this study examines the formation of individual social identity 
specifically in the female members of the Chechen Black Widows at a micro level, 
paying specific attention to the unique combinations of groups influencing identity. The 
structure for this evaluation is again discussion, at both the macro and micro levels, of the 
three components from which social identity is derived: cognitive, evaluative, and 
emotional, the use of social creativity, and markers in social interaction, specifically 
shame. 
B. MACRO LEVEL—GROUP IDENTITY 
1. The Respective Significance of the Individual Group 
In Chechnya, the in-group is rooted in the native majority. Evolved from clans 
under loose guidance by Sufi mystics espousing various interpretations of Islam, 
Chechens in the Caucasus region unified to keep control from neighboring Russia at the 
start of what would become the first Russo-Chechen War in 1991.159 This war, a 
predictable, post-succession conflict, was triggered primarily by the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and fueled by Russia’s desire to control Chechnya.160 Not until after the 
start of the second Russo-Chechen war in 1999 did Afghani Islamic militants join the 
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Chechens, which provided them with connections to terrorist financiers and promoted a 
more radical Islamic ideology and the use of suicide terrorism.161  
“Chechen conflict bred specifically Chechen terrorist fighters” with culturally 
significant motivations and goals.162 Chechens branded their mission as nationalist 
because the practice of Islam was not consistent among clans nor a cohesive, primary 
motive for the fight for independence from a repressive Russian regime.163 The 
collective Chechen in-group assembled against an outside attacker to protect members, 
their land, and particularly, their freedom to live as they have for thousands of years, and 
without which the group would not need to exist.164 Though not unusual, it is significant 
in the way it contributes, or rather does not contribute, to group identity. Unified by the 
collective rejection of the communist, atheist Soviet Union, the group lacks a strong, 
cohesive identity that contrasts with other out-groups, which is central to fostering 
positive group social identity in members.165 Radicalized Islam is a successful surrogate 
for group identity because it is especially difficult to “de-politicize,” and hastens back to 
their natural, retaliatory culture.166 However, the group struggles to maintain group 
identity and group individuality, and when not under threat, “no recognition of a 
sovereign authority” actually exists, both of which result in an often-defunct in-group.167  
Migrant Islamic fighters in Chechnya contribute to the complex dynamics of the 
in-group, as they do not support intermittent decentralization and seek to create a 
fundamentalist Islamic Republic that promotes a more radical strain of Islam and is 
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governed by strict Sharia Law.168 Though Chechen Muslims belong to the Sunni 
movement, more consistent with their historical brotherhoods and “folk Islam,” the 
continued presence of the foreign fighters makes the Chechen Nationalist group a 
reluctant member of a larger in-group, radical Islamic fundamentalists, even if only by 
perception.169 Since the majority of the Chechens does not identify as Islamic 
fundamentalists but instead see themselves as secular freedom fighters, little influence 
results at the macro level on the collective Chechen identity as it relates to this 
discussion; however, it contributes to a contentious environment even during breaks in 
the fighting.170 The influence of the internal conflict between migrant fighters and 
members of the in-group who still hope for peace and a civil society are discussed later, 
as it is more significant to identity formation at the micro level.171  
2. The Differences in Social Roles between Men and Women 
As in other Muslim countries, women in Chechnya are not highly valued, even 
those better educated and more independent than their foreign counterparts are.172 Prior 
to Soviet rule, women were considered property, “commoditized as objects of political 
exchanges.”173 The Soviets continued to use them as pawns to improve employment 
opportunities and qualify for economic incentives based on birth rates.174 A woman’s 
role is strictly defined as domestic. As such, she was excluded from participation in 
societal public activities.175 The external Chechen narrative shifted during the first 
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Russo-Chechen War away from framing women as victims of historical misogyny 
prevalent in the region, to framing them as victims of Islamic culture and of the war.176 
Doing so served to reinforce gender stereotypes rather than elevate their status, as 
women’s bodies were still being engaged for their usefulness and the structure of power 
still remained with the men.177 
The second Russo-Chechen War differed from the first with the significant 
involvement of migrant Arabs, following a much more radical form of Islam.178 Seeking 
to establish an Islamic State in Chechnya, opportunistic migrants capitalized on Chechen 
militant Wahabbi ideological influences to aid in unifying the clans under Islam and 
Sharia.179 Expanded Islamic law perpetuated the authority of the men, and for women 
delivered mixed messages; Arab attire was required and the subjugation of women 
continued, yet emancipation was promised to those women who would become 
warriors.180 Leaders encouraged familiar, Wahabbist clan-based practices to reinforce 
ascribed gender roles in the Chechen women because they harkened back to an ethos of 
revenge and duty while minimizing the competing narrative of women as “double 
deviants.”181 Even the nickname Black Widows characterizes them as separate from the 
men, exceptional, other.182 
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3. The Manner of Dealing with Inequality 
Indigenous Chechens were divided along clan and territorial lines.183 Sufism lent 
itself well to a clan system where the clan leader was also the head of the Sufi group.184 
At times, clans were known to battle; feuds arose over family disagreements and 
territories. However, the people were similarly committed to a set of common practices 
that discouraged stratification among and between clans.185 In homogenous groups like 
the clans, positive social identity is fostered through shared experiences more so than 
through actions on behalf of the larger in-group.186 Chechens are tied together as 
indigenous people, under shared ideals as Muslims, and are equals in their obedience to 
God.187 The perceived lower social status of women, perhaps most visible in the distinct 
roles for men and women and where the bravery of men was well historicized and 
women’s bodies were commodities exploited for political and economic gain, is 
rationalized by the strictly defined patriarchal structures in both the cultural contexts of 
the original clans and the “Qur’anic prescriptions of Masculinity.”188 
4. The Degree of Tolerance for the Unknown 
Historically, the clans in the Caucasus region were not tightly connected until the 
period leading up to the Russo-Chechen Wars; a great degree of variation existed 
between clans, and during times of peace, no unifying leadership demanded unity.189 As 
previously noted, the early influence of Islam was open to interpretation for each clan 
under its Sufi mystic or brotherhood, and clans took from the teachings what best fit the 
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needs and realities of their members.190 Each clan had control over its members, but 
ambiguous leadership between clans allowed for individual preferences and behaviors to 
prevail.191 After the dissolution of the Soviet Republic, Chechnya attempted to revert 
back to the way things had been. However, as anticommunism and anti-Russian feelings 
blossomed under the threat of Russian control in the 1970s and 1980s, and impromptu 
political demonstrations evolved during religious gatherings, the lines between religion 
and ethnic pride began to blur.192 For the first time, religion had begun to subordinate 
tribalism.193 However, unlike in countries where terrorism is closely tied to Islam, 
Chechen Muslims insist the violence is directed against a repressive Russia and not in 
support of an “Islamic ideology that accords with global Salafi Jihad.”194 The collective 
Chechen rebuke of harsh Salafi Sharia, inconsistent with their understanding of Islam, 
indicates the ties that bind them are only as strong as their common enemy.195 Moreover, 
once Russia has been defeated, their syncretic Muslim identity and decentralized 
leadership would support a return to a “natural culture,” of which religion is but one 
dimension.196  
5. Social Identity Construct 
Chechens have spent the majority of their cultural and spiritual life 
forming an identity within—and apart from—the communist, atheist 
Soviet Union.197 
Chechen nationalism alone was insufficient to catalyze the kind of unified 
objective needed to stave off Russian occupation, so after the first Russo-Chechen War, 
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the Chechens called on the Islamist ideology of jihad to fortify them for the second war 
with Russia.198 The resulting Chechen identity is steeped in religious tradition, and 
shaped by resistance and deportation; justification for their independence.199 What the 
Chechen people are not is as important to their identity as what they are. They reject strict 
Sharia implications for themselves, but are nonetheless caught in a war of religious 
radicalism in which the media portrays them as warriors “against all infidels.”200 The 
Chechen code of conduct subsists as an undercurrent to their Muslim identity: respect for 
elders, veneration of ancestors, strict rules of hospitality, courtesy in public and private 
behavior, and moral ethics.201 The code dovetails with traditional Muslim and Sufi 
practices, yet softens the edges of the violent, fundamentalist Muslim identity ascribed to 
the stricter brand of Salafi Islam brought by the migrant Arabs.  
The media plays a significant role in constructing the public social identities of 
the Chechens, particularly the women, and leverages their stories as both a cautionary 
message and powerful recruiting tool.202 The coverage of female actors also tends to 
focus more on associated individual motivation versus group motivation and is more 
likely to include details on social conditions, discrimination, or hardships like the 
heartbreaking tales of women like Zulikhan Elikhadzhiveva and Zarema 
Muzhakhoyeva.203 Zulikhan was training to be a midwife until her brother reportedly 
kidnapped her. He held for five months in Moscow before she blew herself up at a rock 
concert.204 Zarema had taken out a loan after her husband was killed and accepted the 
suicide mission in exchange for debt forgiveness and money for her family.205 The 
stories about both Zulikhan and Zarema lend credibility to the narrative that women are 
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targeted and coerced.206 Russian journalist Maria Zhirkova calls it “zombification,” 
which describes the way the women are rendered unaware of what is happening due to 
their own grief, vulnerable to coercion or blackmail.207 Even the name Black Widows, 
purportedly given to them by the Russian press, connotes both revenge and sorrow, two 
images powerful enough to overshadow the significant human rights abuses and 
oppression in Chechnya.208 The Russians publicly represent the women as victims 
manipulated by Chechen terrorists, and coerced into engaging in suicide terrorism, while 
the Chechen’s counter with stories of revenge for rapes and murders perpetrated by 
Russian soldiers.209 Either way, the men ascribe these social identities to the women, and 
as such, both influence and complicate individual social identity formation. 
The powerful, opposing public narratives of the Black Widows presented by the 
out-group threaten the in-group social identity constructs of these women, and 
compromise their value to the in-group.210 The Chechen’s counter narrative is employed 
to manage in-group perception of the female fighters in a way that minimizes the 
dichotomy of female fighters. It attempts both to preserve the women’s identities as 
warriors on behalf of the group, and maintain the fact that they are still women, often 
victims, subservient, and in need of defending.211 However, “to claim that women are 
willing to die and take the lives of many others because of their obedience to the men at 
the top of the Chechen military echelons is a mistaken oversimplification of complex 
gender relations even in a revenge culture.”212 At the macro level, the abundance of 
conflicting narratives and counter narratives for the motivations of the Black Widows 
supports the argument that in-group identity construction is complex but is insufficient to 
cultivate suicide terrorist identities among female members by itself. Likewise, isolating 
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individual, personal motivations for suicide terrorism excludes the effects in-group 
identity, its mix of political and religious elements, has on individual identity 
formation.213 It is more likely that female terrorist identities at the macro level emerge 
out of complex environments where patriarchal oppression is a staple of their existence 
and commitment to this identity is both voluntary and involuntary.214  
C. MICRO LEVEL—INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY 
Viv Groskop wrote in 2004, “almost every suicide bombing connected to 
Chechnya in the last two years has involved women.”215 For a society in which women 
have been traditionally, at best, domesticated peacekeepers, and at worst, property, it is 
surprising to see female suicide bombings as a growth industry.216 Portrayed as 
“Shakhidkis” or martyrs, Chechen Black Widows look like any other Muslim woman on 
the street.217 They are primarily young, and while some are widows or have lost family 
members to violence, others never married and had professional careers.218 Most are 
believed to be enacting revenge for the death of husbands or loved ones, or as martyrs; 
either being successfully targeted, brainwashed, even raped, drugged, and blackmailed by 
the terrorist group, or as willful actors free to martyr themselves once acts of martyrdom 
were no longer considered banned by the Koran.219 They are also the most feared 
militants in the country, which raises questions about the motives of women being willing 
to kill for political ends.220 
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Whether or not Black Widows are truly martyrs and different from the Freedom 
Fighters in other Arab countries where terrorism is more closely associated with 
fundamentalism, hinges on women being portrayed as victims.221 The majority of 
Chechens find the radical ideas of Jihad inconsistent with true Chechen character.222 One 
danger of religious fundamentalism and media propaganda in a war for independence is 
the erosion of the old national identity.223 The media perpetuates the image of a weak 
woman being forced to commit acts of terrorism as a pawn in a larger game.224 However, 
nuanced differences that may go unnoticed by the media, between a woman martyring 
herself and a woman who appears to be a martyr based on her actions, are significant as 
they relate to social identity.225 Stories of women dressed in black, compelled to avenge 
the deaths of loved ones as revenge, shift the narrative to one of personal motives, but is 
no less a constructed narrative.226 At the macro level, the narrative of the female suicide 
terrorist is constructed by the media, the families of the actors, and by the in-group itself, 
so that it serves the goals of the larger group.227 At the micro level, individual social 
identity is constructed based on relationships and perception of value, and has a 
tremendous impact on behavior.228  
1. Cognitive Component 
Awareness that one is Chechen is instilled from birth. However, the current 
nationalist identity in Chechnya is inseparable from the Muslim identity; to be one is to 
be both, at least for now.229 Deconstructing what that means for women involves 
identifying both the overlapping and unique roles and expectations for each group. In this 
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case, they are similar. Both Chechen and Muslim expectations for women derive from 
strictly patriarchal structures.230 Relegated to the “domestic sphere,” women are 
expected to maintain households, bear and raise children, and be subservient to the men: 
fathers, husbands, or brothers.231 Much of the literature on female suicide terrorists stops 
at this point, which suggests the large in-group is the most influential on identity, and 
ultimately, radicalization. Closer examination reveals micro-level in-groups to which 
these women also belong that may also influence identity.  
In Chechnya, women are members of families, clans, and groups of clans, each 
with a unique identity and expectations for members.232 Clans adopted Islam differently, 
and though Chechens believe they are all “joined in equality in obedience to God,” 
differences exist in how tightly clans ascribe to the tenets of “their particular strand of 
folk Islam.”233 Drilling down even further, their experiences and life circumstances 
assign additional identities to the women.234 Victims of rape, widows to war, the 
formally educated, the poor, those who work outside the home, experience similar in-
group influence on identity just as with the larger social, religious, and familial in-
groups.235 In addition, the more there are, the more likely they are to have competing 
interests or values. An individual’s ability to reconcile inconsistent influences on social 
identity depends partly on how closely connected she is to each in-group, and the degree 
to which positive social identity within that group generates self-interests versus 
collective interests.236  
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2. Evaluative Component 
Chechen’s in-group social identity is complex because it is made up of many 
smaller in-groups who have come together under a new collective worldview.237 Existing 
in a defensive status and separated into smaller groups by geography, the Chechens have 
been engaged in defending themselves against Russian oppression since the late 18th 
century.238 The common mission is not guided by a loyal or abiding faith in something, 
but rather a willingness to come under the banner of a common structure to build a 
unified front after having lost a significant portion of the population to war and to asylum 
in other countries.239 Banding together to defend against a common enemy, as opposed 
to mobilizing for social or political change, or for control of a geographic region, does 
not foster the same positive connotation for the members of the in-group. As a result, 
individuals are more susceptible to influence by more local groups. Depending on the 
similarities in the practice of Islam adopted by the collective in-group with that of each 
smaller group, some Chechens struggle to assimilate and be connected at all.240 
Moreover, since many still aspire to a civil society, terrorist activities, though perhaps 
necessary to the large in-group’s strategy, are not supported by everyone, which makes 
the Black Widows outcasts among their own people.241 Smaller societies within the large 
in-group continue to cling to a traditional gender dichotomy so even though the large in-
group tries to control the internal narrative of the Black Widows as victims, it cannot 
compensate for the individual struggles with self-esteem when the larger group identity is 
either not being activated or is too remote.242  
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3. Emotional Component  
Identity defines a person, not only to herself, but also to others around her, and 
seeks to dictate her ideal presence.243 To that end, people constantly negotiate and 
construct their identities to match ideals, both their own ideals and those of the groups to 
which they belong. When environments and specific events, like war or trauma, threaten 
individual, core emotions like worthiness, pride, shame, or power, identity transformation 
helps to return individual identity to a positive state, or at least to equilibrium.244 
Political violence in Chechnya is unique in that unlike freedom fighters, martyrdom is 
more common among Chechens, particularly in the women.245 Since both men and 
women take up fighting out of despair, these motivations cannot be completely 
differentiated along gender lines; however, significant differences appear.246 The 
external Black Widow narrative constructed by the media of a woman clad in black from 
head to toe, seeking to avenge the death of a husband or brother, emphasizes the 
individual motive for women over the collective, political motive, as is generally the case 
for men.247 Thus, while both are portrayed as martyrs in the literal sense, the behavior for 
the women is more closely associated with revenge, a personal motive. Group social 
identity seeks to depersonalize members to influence behavior and reaffirm social 
structure, so insinuating that an action is solely based on personal reasons serves to 
separate a person from the group.248 That separation, even if only perceived or possible, 
is at the root of shame. Shame has already been established as a significant motivation for 
suicide terrorism; however, the discussion was limited to the shame imposed after a 
seminal event—the death of a spouse, being unable to have children, being sexually 
impure—and did not address the internal shame caused by conflicting narratives that 
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The two case studies, the LTTE and the Chechen Black Widows, used a common 
structure to give historical context, evaluate in-group social identity at the macro and 
micro levels, and to evaluate the correlation between individual and group social identity 
and shame. Both case studies examined terrorist groups where religious or ethnic 
standards dictate female subservience, and that use female suicide terrorism as a strategic, 
violent tactic. Both groups were evaluated to identify specific markers in-group and 
individual identity formation that could be indicative of specific in-group relationships 
unique to women that influence social identity, and whether shifts in those relationships 
increased the potential for these women to experience shame. The following 
commonalities in the construct of in-group social identity were identified. 
1. Group Identity Construct 
Loyal, nationalist group identity for both the LTTE and native Chechens is strong. 
The LTTE originated as the smaller group fighting for control of Sri Lanka and the Tamil 
people, and leveraged membership in the in-group to recruit members and fighters. By 
contrast, native Chechens have held the majority in Chechnya but are fighting to keep the 
Russians from taking control.  
The difference in social roles between men and women was significant for both 
groups. Neither group was particularly supportive of women being educated or holding 
positions of significance outside the home.250 Both patriarchal groups defined women’s 
roles as domestic and subservient, and highly prized purity.  
The public narratives of the women in both groups were manipulated to show 
them as martyrs and victims, absolving themselves of shame that resulted from rape or 
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other disgraceful circumstances through sacrifice.251 The inclusion of women as warriors 
in the LTTE, originally a tactic to supplement a diminished cadre of fighters, was also 
designed to exploit the media and public biases around women.252 The women in 
Chechnya were portrayed by the media and to the public as dangerous, loyal, deadly 
fighters acting out of revenge or retaliation.253 These carefully curated narratives of 
female suicide terrorists are critical to their strategic use as tactics to compel fear in 
members of the out-group and achieve a specific political goal.254 In both case studies, 
the public narrative is inconsistent with the realities of women in the in-groups, which 
suggests that the constructed narrative is as much an operational tactic as is the suicide 
itself and should not be mistaken for motive.  
Both groups controlled the internal narrative of the women, as well to preserve 
their value to the group and to socialize the women back into their usual roles.255 The 
LTTE assigned similar social identities to both men and women in the in-group, while the 
Chechens shifted the focus internally from woman-as-warrior back to woman-as-
victim.256 It is unclear whether the in-group was attempting to preserve positive social 
identity in the women or to preserve social order and reduce the potential for the men to 
feel emasculated or ashamed, feelings associated with negative social identity.257 What 
can be inferred is that the conflicting narratives of the women left them vulnerable to 
diminished positive social identity due to the lack of clear and resounding in-group 
support and acceptance.258  
The influence of both in-groups on individual female members was significant in 
that primary in-group salience was high due to ethno-nationalistic loyalty. While ethno-
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nationalistic loyalty is usually a predictor of high positive social identity in members, the 
significance is due to it being high despite the roles and expectations for the women not 
being consistent, which is an obstacle to individual positive social identity. In such 
patriarchal groups, in-group salience among women is particularly high due to the 
combination of existing individual ethno-nationalism and strict social or religious rules 
that demand loyalty and subservience to the men in the in-group. Those same rules that 
preserve and maintain chastity and fidelity in women also increase male cohesion by 
reducing competition among the men, which can be a source of in-group adversity.259 
However, unlike for the men, women become vulnerable to diminished positive social 
identity in two ways, by violating the expectations for the in-group as a whole, and by 
violating expectations based on gender roles within the group. Further, in-group 
manipulation of social and religious values to allow women to fight, coupled with the 
manipulation of the narrative of the female fighter, created fluid boundaries for women 
that threatened positive social identity and connection with the in-group.260 
2. Individual Identity Construct 
“In order to understand the factors that drive women to take up terrorism, it is 
imperative that we understand the role played by women and the subsequent 
transformations witnessed therein.”261 The women in the two case studies were members 
of societies with already established structures where social categories and roles preceded 
them, and where the unique combinations of social categories and roles drive identity 
formation.262 In both the LTTE and within the individual smaller groups in Chechnya, 
social roles were divided along gender lines, with women assigned to lower status, 
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subservient roles, which were centered primarily in the home.263 Normally, gender roles 
in patriarchal societies remain relatively constant; however, “one of the factors that most 
significantly accelerates a shift in gender roles is armed conflict.”264 In the previous 
section, gender roles were discussed as they relate to relationships with the primary in-
group as a whole. Shifting gender roles also affect how an individual sees herself and 
influence her own perception of self, particularly when someone else manufactures the 
shifts.265  
Some research suggests shifting roles create a “fragmented self-composed of a 
cluster of sub selves,” which is thought to explain how women reconcile acting both 
morally and rationally in some circumstances, and in others, quite the opposite.266 
Likewise, social action, missions associated with in-group goals, is believed to be closely 
connected to shifts in the perception or definition of self.267 Chechen women and women 
of the LTTE were both shown to be members of smaller in-groups and minority groups 
based on societal roles and on life experiences. It may be possible that these concurrent 
memberships contribute to the fragmented self as well.  
The concept of shame has been manipulated throughout the literature on suicide 
terrorism to suggest a singular, emotional predisposing factor, or tipping point in women 
that leads to radicalization.268 The threat of disconnection and resulting shame occur in a 
group setting especially under the following conditions: when members are expected to 
display values or abilities, when members are judged against each other as being more or 
less worthy of membership or acceptance, or when particular characteristics are 
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stigmatized within the group.269 Shame has primarily been discussed in the context of 
suicide terrorism only as it relates to external pressures from the in-group as a whole, as 
opposed to it evolving from both external influence and internal identity dissonance that 
results from relationships with other, smaller in-groups or individuals. The result may be 
the same, submission and withdrawal. However, because “shame is linked to moral and 
normative rules and rule formation,” it can result from either disconnection from the 
group that makes the rules or disconnection from others who must abide by them.270 
While all members are held to the values and expectations determined by the in-group, in 
patriarchal societies, such as the LTTE and in Chechnya, the men dictate the rules for the 
group.271 This control sets up the dynamic where the women are judged, not only by the 
group or the men, but also by each other. Competition within the in-group also elicits 
shame by threatening the social bond with both other individuals and the group as a 
whole.272  
Morality is gender specific in both case studies, and the morality of the women is 
the fabric of the morality of her family and of the community.273 Vicarious shame is 
defined as “the emotion that people experience when their self is (imaginarily) threatened 
by the behaviour [sic] of others” or even by someone’s association with, or similarity, to 
others.274 Vicarious shame gives context to why LTTE or Chechen families might 
experience shame based on the status of a single member, why an individual might 
experience compounded shame by virtue of having membership in multiple groups some 
of which have conflicting expectations for members, or why women might judge 
themselves unworthy based on connections, or similarities they have with others who 
have been deemed unworthy.275 
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B. FINDINGS  
Women’s involvement in terrorism remains a complex phenomenon.276 
Three primary findings from this research suggest social identity formation 
influences radicalization in women who become suicide terrorists. First, female social 
identity formation in patriarchal terrorist groups is different from that of males, second, 
multiple and conflicting influences on social identity increase the potential for real or 
perceived disconnection from the in-group, and third, the shame that results from social 
identity shifts is a unique, motivating factor for suicide terrorism in women. One 
secondary finding is also included because of its relevance to earlier theories on 
motivation. Evidence from the case studies specifically calls into question both strong 
ethno-nationalism and martyrdom as singular, primary motivations in women. 
1. Female Social Identity Formation is Unique 
Since social roles are divided along gender lines for the Chechen people and the 
LTTE, and because social roles in patriarchal, terrorist groups have been shown to have 
significant influence on social identity based on the case studies provided, the first 
finding is that social identity formation in women is unique. The primary basis for this 
finding is the evidence of manipulation of both social and religious values that allowed 
women to engage in fighting, and the need for a constructed internal narrative of the 
female fighter, which together indicate that primary in-group membership for women 
must be curated and managed by the group. Competing narratives define these women, as 
they are “double deviants” who violate laws of society and nature.277 Conversely, 
strategic violence and missions in support of group objectives perpetrated by men are 
accepted at face value and both the public and private narratives are already in alignment. 
No evidence from the case studies shows that social roles for men are inconsistent with 
the expectations from the in-group, and the reframing of the female narrative further 
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facilitates solidarity in the men, which thus reduces a primary influence on negative 
social identity formation.278 
2. Conflicting Influences on Social Identity Threaten Connection with 
the In-Group 
The second primary finding is an increase in disconnection from the in-group, and 
subsequent shame response, in female terrorists subject to conflicting influences on their 
social identities. Unequal power relationships in both case studies set the women up to 
experience both stigmatized victimization and oppression.279 Since social equality is not 
an ideal, when it does occur, as in the case of female warriors, it must be undermined.280 
This concept contradicts what Tajfel defines as one of “the two most important a priori 
defining characteristics of a social group,” similarity between members.281 The groups 
rely heavily on the social roles to rationalize these discrepancies; however, differences 
erode connection with the in-group in favor of membership in minority groups where 
members are more alike.282 Leaving the group is almost never an option for these 
women, so they must either reconstruct their own identities to reconcile the disconnect 
with the in-group or engage in activities designed to shift the in-group’s perception of 
them.283 
3. Shame as a Motivating Factor for Suicide Terrorism in Women 
The final primary finding is evidence that the experience of shame is a motivating 
factor for female suicide terrorists because of its profound connection to threats to the 
social bond, withdrawal from the in-group, and in extreme cases, dissolution of the self 
and a desire to disappear.284 “The motivational state, nonverbal displays, and behaviors 
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associated with shame all support the premise that it is related to submission and 
withdrawal.”285 Given the expectation that the women are subservient to both the men 
and the in-groups in both the patriarchal LTTE and Chechen in-groups, it follows that the 
potential for shame is high in both groups. Both groups shared similar stories of women 
martyring themselves to be absolved of the shame associated with traumatic events, 
which is also consistent with the historical literature on female suicide terrorists. Lastly, it 
is pertinent to note emerging theoretical and empirical evidence now suggests that not 
only is shame a consequence of negative social evaluation and identity, it evokes a 
physiological response similar to the fight-or-flight response experienced during extreme 
threats to physical safety.286 Though research on this topic is in its infancy, proving a 
correlation may provide a definitive link between the shame response experienced when 
women are disconnected or threatened with disconnection from the in-group, and a 
violent, physical response.287 Further, data from future studies that shows causation at a 
physiological level may also indicate that the mitigation of shame is an important 
consideration in combatting suicide terrorism and other kinds of violence. 
4. Ethno-nationalism and Martyrdom 
One secondary finding worthy of mention is that while the case studies confirm 
strong ethno-nationalism in both Tamil and Chechen women, they also provide evidence 
that invalidates it as a primary motivation for suicide terrorism by showing that female 
social identity in both of these groups dictates subservience, rather than violence, as a 
display of nationalism. In both case studies, the in-group does not abandon traditional 
expectations of the women despite shifted public narratives or granting temporary 
permission to take up different roles in support of the conflict. Evidence from the 
literature showed instead that women who returned from battle struggled even more with 
social identity as the stigma of their actions followed them home.288 Despite efforts to 
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separate them from the men and require uniforms that met the standards of modesty, 
these women were not welcomed home as heroes but instead found it difficult to marry or 
to be accepted as the women they once were.289 Further, any shifts in how the women 
saw themselves in their new roles as fighters did not last, and by definition, would not 
increase positive social identity in that it comes from in-group, rather than internal, 
validation.  
Social identity theory indicates that when members of the in-group act in support 
of the group mission, it brings them closer to the group, and the behavior is met with 
appreciation and acceptance, which results in an increase in positive social identity. 
When men engage in tactical operations in support of the in-group’s mission, they are 
rewarded and their social identity improves. After women engage in similar behaviors 
and operational tactics, they must revert back to traditional, acceptable behavior to stay in 
favor with the in-group. Though the in-group may publicly laud their service, their value 
within the in-group and resulting positive social identity still rely on a return to normal, 
subservient feminine roles. 
In both the Tamil Tigers and the Black Widows, martyrdom has long been 
suspected as rationale for women to participate in violent tactics of terrorist groups; 
however, upon closer examination, it appears to be a designation bestowed on these 
women rather than something to which they aspire. Hawstone and Jaspers concluded that 
people generally cannot understand what they have not experienced, and therefore, would 
not be able to predict motives for behavior accurately in people who do not have the same 
in-group experiences.290 This point is important to consider in the discussion of social 
identity formation varying by gender. The constructed public narrative is generated 
primarily by the leadership of the in-groups, who are men, and by the media. For a 
Chechen or LTTE woman to engage in an act of suicide terrorism, she would have to 
defy her role as a female member of the in-group. This defiance would place her at odds 
with the group’s expectations for her behavior and subject her to disapproval and 
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separation from the group, neither of which would serve to improve her social identity. 
Finally, both case studies show that despite temporary changes in women’s roles during 
conflict, the terrorist in-group influence drives women to revert back to abiding by 
gender-based cultural norms that do not embrace martyrdom or violence. Competing 
discourses produce unique gender identities not analytically independent from 
nationalism or ethno national identities.291 These findings are inconsistent with 
martyrdom as a primary motivator. 
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The terrorist identity itself is born out of, and thrives on, the “perception of 
marginalization and disenfranchisement,” with the emphasis on perception.292 Humans 
are constantly adjusting to social change, particularly those who are members of terrorist 
groups, which demands preserving individual integrity by reconciling traditional values 
with shifting group dynamics, and taking into account the multiplicity of power 
relationships.293 At the macro level, the group rallies against perceived injustices that 
have been or will be imposed on the people as a whole; at the micro level, the individuals 
reconcile their own identities as members of the group based on a perceived potential for 
inclusion or exclusion from the group itself. A woman is not just a woman, she comes 
from somewhere and identifies with particular social, cultural, and political groups, any 
of which are potential points of conflict.294 This complicated internal conflict becomes 
oppressive and intolerable whenever group dynamics are inconsistent with core or 
individual values, particularly those born of religion or ethnicity, with no clear path 
forward. At this point, the innate aversion to shame renders the individual increasingly 
vulnerable both to suggestion and to engaging in actions that preserve or restore value.295 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
What is…important is a clear realization that the general case is an 
impossible myth as long as human beings behave as they do because of 
the social expectations with which they enter… any other social 
situation.296  
The implications of this thesis are significant to understanding how identity 
formation and transformation influence vulnerability to radicalization in women who 
become suicide terrorists. Social identity theory provided a useful framework for 
analyzing identity formation while allowing for the isolation of variables in the subjects, 
like gender, a potentially important distinction for the development of counter terrorism 
and counter-recruitment methods. Through this lens, the case studies revealed a 
correlation between negative social identity, shame, and radicalized terrorist behavior in 
women in both groups, and provided evidence to support a causal relationship. More 
research is needed to confirm a definitive correlation in a wider study group and to prove 
a causal relationship; however, these findings compel a shift in the discussion of 
motivation to one that embraces a feminist analysis of all the complexities of social 
identity and its influence on behavior, most specifically the role of shame.  
The influence of trauma in the context of identity transformation, and that which 
results from sustained exposure to violence, has largely been omitted from this 
discussion, but deserves further investigation, as it may prove to have standing in the 
overall discussion of influences on identity formation in suicide terrorists. Likewise, this 
thesis only just acknowledges the implications of domestic violence insofar as victims 
may be categorized as belonging to a victim in-group. It fails to investigate further any 
specific correlation between female suicide terrorists and domestic violence; about which 
new literature is emerging.297  
The final recommendation for future study is to investigate how existing shame 
and stigmatization may make women vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist organizations, 
particularly women in Western countries. Israeli intelligence identifies “a clear effort… 
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to recruit as suicide terrorists those young women who find themselves in acute 
emotional distress due to social stigmatization.”298 This thesis focused only on women 
radicalized to suicide terrorism who were already members of the terrorist organization; 
however, this and other foreign and domestic intelligence show a directed effort to recruit 
young women.299  
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